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Abstract
We introduce a perfect price discriminating (PPD) mechanism for allocation problems
with private information. A PPD mechanism treats a seller, for example, as a perfect
price discriminating monopolist who faces a price schedule that does not depend on her
report. In any PPD mechanism, every player has a dominant strategy to truthfully re-
port her private information. We establish a revelation principle for dominant strategy
implementation: any outcome that can be dominant strategy implemented can also be
dominant strategy implemented using a PPD mechanism. We apply this principle to
derive the optimal, budget-balanced, dominant strategy mechanisms for public good
provision and bilateral bargaining.
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1 Introduction
In allocation problems with incomplete information, economists search for mechanisms that
implement a desirable outcome in some equilibrium, such as Bayesian-Nash and dominant
strategy equilibrium. Although dominant strategy equilibrium is more restrictive than
Bayesian-Nash, it has many desirable properties. For example, dominant strategies are
not sensitive to the belief of any player about the other playersinformation or strategies.1
However, the best outcome under Bayesian-Nash implementation may not be implementable
using dominant strategies. Take the well known example of a public good: the outcome that
is both budget-balanced and e¢ cient can be Bayesian-Nash implemented by the expected
externality mechanism, but cannot be dominant strategy implemented by any mechanism.2
If the performance shortfall is not too big, the mechanism designer may decide in favor of a
dominant strategy mechanism. In this paper, we provide a revelation principle that charac-
terizes all dominant strategy mechanisms for allocation problems, thus facilitating the search
for optimal dominant strategy mechanisms.
We introduce perfect price discriminating (PPD) mechanisms and show that they play
a dening role in dominant strategy implementation. In a PPD mechanism, each player
faces a price schedule that is exogenous to her report. To a buyer, this price schedule gives
the prices she would have to pay for each unit, such as $10 for the rst unit, $15 for the
second unit, etc. To a seller, this price schedule gives the prices that she would be paid for
each unit. A player cannot change the prices that she would pay (or be paid) for any unit.
Although a players price schedule does not depend on her own report, it generally depends
on the other playersreports. A player rst reports her type to the mechanism designer, who
then determines the quantity that maximizes the players payo¤, given the price schedule
and the players reported type. Thus, the PPD mechanism treats a seller as a perfect price
1For other advantages of dominant strategy implementation, see Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) and
the references therein.
2See, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1992, pp 271-274) for details.
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discriminating monopolist and a buyer as a perfect price discriminating monopsonist. The
well known Vickrey auction is one example of a PPD mechanism. Many other mechanisms
in the literature can also be formulated as PPD mechanisms, as we demonstrate in the
conclusion.
As in the Vickrey auction, every player has a dominant strategy to report her type truth-
fully in any PPD mechanism (Proposition 4). Given the exogenous nature of the price sched-
ule that a player faces, misreporting her type can only mess up the optimization problem
to maximize this players payo¤. We establish a revelation principle for dominant strategies
(Proposition 5): every outcome that can be dominant strategy implemented can also be
dominant strategy implemented with a PPD mechanism. This result identies the funda-
mental cause for dominant strategies that is universal to all allocation problems. We refer
to this result as a revelation principle because of its similar avor to the original Revelation
Principle: every outcome that can be Bayesian-Nash implemented can also be Bayesian-Nash
implemented with a direct mechanism.3 With the original Revelation Principle, a mecha-
nism designer may restrict attention to direct mechanisms when searching for Bayesian-Nash
implementation. With our revelation principle, a mechanism designer may restrict attention
to PPD mechanisms when searching for dominant strategy implementation.
Building PPDmechanisms involves constructing the price schedule for each player. Often,
specic goals like budget-balancedness or specic features of the environment considerably
restrict the price schedules. In other words, the special format of PPD mechanisms in itself
greatly simplies the search for dominant strategy mechanisms, and then particulars of the
problem may further simplify the search. To show how to put our revelation principle to
work, we build PPD mechanisms for public good provision and bilateral bargaining problems
with budget-balancedness in mind. The nature of these problems impose severe quantity
restrictions. In the public good problem, one player obtains the public good if and only if
3Myerson (2008) gives a historical perspective on mechanism design and the role of the Revelation Prin-
ciple.
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every player also obtains the public good. In the bargaining problem, the buyer receives the
good if and only if the seller relinquishes the good. We exploit these restrictions in sections 4
and 5 to nd the budget-balanced dominant strategy mechanisms that maximize the players
payo¤s.
There are several strands of literature related to our work. Green and La¤ont (1977)
and Holmstrom (1979) nd that essentially all e¢ cient, dominant strategy mechanisms are
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms.4 Our Proposition 5 shows that any dominant strat-
egy incentive compatible mechanism must be a PPD mechanism, so in a way we generalize
the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms relaxing the requirement of e¢ ciency. Mookherjee
and Reichelstein (1992) identify su¢ cient conditions that ensure there is no welfare loss in
strengthening the equilibrium concept from Bayesian-Nash to dominant strategy. However,
these su¢ cient conditions may fail. In Myerson and Satterthwaits (1982) bilateral bar-
gaining, our results allow us to nd the optimal dominant strategy mechanism, and for the
example when the buyers and sellers values are uniformly distributed, we quantify that
the best dominant strategy implementation costs 11% of the gains available in the best
Bayesian-Nash implementation. The mechanism designer would weigh this loss against the
informational benets of using dominant strategies. Our result for bilateral bargaining com-
plements Hagerty and Rogerson (1987), who show that xed-price mechanisms are essentially
the only budget-balanced, dominant strategy mechanisms. Our revelation principle allows
us immediately to show that the optimal, budget-balanced, dominant strategy mechanism
is a xed-price mechanism. Other papers have also considered sacricing some e¢ ciency in
favor of dominant strategies, showing that losses decrease as the number of players increase.
McAfee (1992) does this for double auctions, and Moulin (2007a, b) does this for single-unit
and multi-unit rationing problems. Moulin (2007a, b) also contain references to several other
papers in this vein.
The rest of this is organized as follows. In Section 2, we rst lay out the basic problem
4See Milgrom (2004, pages 71-73) for a thoughtful treatment of the Green-La¤ont-Holmstrom theorem.
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and then introduce PPD mechanisms. In Section 3, we establish the main result: any direct
mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible if and only if it is a PPD mechanism.
Applying this principle, we solve for the optimal, budget-balanced, dominant strategy mech-
anisms for public good provision in Section 4 and bilateral bargaining in Section 5. In Section
6, we conclude by reformulating a number of well known dominant strategy mechanisms as
PPD mechanisms.
2 Allocation Mechanisms
We consider allocation schemes among players with private values. Let N = f1; : : : ; ng be
the set of n players. Let i be player is type for i 2 N ,  i = (1; : : : ; i 1; i+1; : : : ; n) be the
type prole of player is opponents, and  = (i;  i) be the prole of player types. Assume
 is jointly distributed on [0; 1]n according to distribution function F (). For each i 2 N ,
let Fi() denote the marginal distribution of i. An outcome (q; t) = (q1; : : : ; qn; t1; : : : ; tn) 2
Rn  Rn species each player is quantity qi and payment ti. Generally, each player is
utility may depend on the entire outcome and the type prole. In this paper, we focus on
the private value case where each player i has quasilinear utility that depends only on her
own type i and her part of the outcome (qi; ti):
ui(qi; ti; ) = vi (qi; i)  ti:
Assume that vi(0; i) = 0 for all i 2 [0; 1]. Also assume that for all i 2 [0; 1] and qi 2 R,
player is valuation function vi(; i) : R! R satises the following standard conditions:
v1i (qi; i)  @vi(qi; i)=@qi  0; (1)
v1i (qi; i)  v1i (qi; 0i) for i > 0i: (2)
Condition (1) states that player is valuation function is nondecreasing in quantity. Condition
(2) is the single-crossing condition, which implies that player is demand curve increases
with her type i 2 [0; 1]. To apply Milgroms (2004) envelope theorem, we also assume that
4
v2i (qi; i)  @vi(qi; i)=@i exists almost everywhere and is bounded for each i 2 N . As an
aside, player i buys if qi > 0 and sells if qi < 0.
A general mechanism species a set of actions for each player. A players strategy maps
her type to an action. The mechanism also species a mapping from action proles to
outcomes. This induces a game of incomplete information. The performance (such as e¢ -
ciency) of a mechanism is the compound mapping from type proles to outcomes through
the equilibrium strategy prole and the mechanism itself. By convention, a mechanism
dominant strategy implements or Bayesian-Nash implements a particular performance if the
equilibrium is dominant strategy or Bayesian-Nash. A direct mechanism is a special class of
mechanisms where the action sets are identical to the type sets, with the interpretation that
the mechanism designer asks each player to reveal her type. More specically,
Denition 1 In a direct mechanism, each player i 2 N reports her type as ^i 2 [0; 1]. The
mechanism maps the reported prole ^ 2 [0; 1]n to an outcome (q(^); t(^)):
q() : [0; 1]n ! Q and t() : [0; 1]n ! Rn;
where Q  Rn denotes the set of permissible quantity proles.
Given any reported type prole ^, player i will obtain quantity qi(^) and pay ti(^). Thus, any
direct mechanism induces a well-dened game of incomplete information. In the rest of this
paper, we simply refer to a direct mechanism by its quantity and payment rules (q(); t()).
In the game of incomplete information induced by a direct mechanism, a player may or may
not report her type truthfully in a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. The well known Revelation
Principle states that every performance that can be Bayesian-Nash implemented can also be
Bayesian-Nash implemented using a direct mechanism, where players truthfully report their
types.5 Thus, without loss of generality, we restrict our attention to direct mechanisms. We
focus on direct mechanisms that are dominant strategy incentive compatible:
5See Milgrom (2004, pp. 39-42) for a more comprehensive description of general mechanisms, and Krishna
(2002, Proposition 5.1) for a simple treatment of the Revelation Principle.
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Denition 2 A direct mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if for
all i 2 N , and for all i, ^i and  i,
ui (qi(i;  i); ti(i;  i); i)  ui

qi(^i;  i); ti(^i;  i); i

:
In other words, it is always optimal for a player to truthfully report her type, no matter
what the other players report.
In this paper, we establish a revelation principle for dominant strategy implementation:
every performance that can be dominant strategy implemented can also be dominant strategy
implemented using a perfect price discriminating mechanism. A perfect price discriminating
mechanism species a price schedule pi(qi; ^ i) for each player that is used in determining
this players part of the outcome. The price schedule to any player does not depend on this
players own report but may depend on the othersreports. Formally, we have
Denition 3 A direct mechanism (q; t) is a perfect price discriminating (PPD) mechanism
if for all i 2 N and all ^ 2 [0; 1]n, these exist a price schedule pi(; ) : R+  [0; 1]n 1 ! R+
and a lump-sum payment Li() : [0; 1]n 1 ! R such that
qi(^i; ^ i) 2 argmax
qi
Z qi
0
h
v1i (z; ^i)  pi(z; ^ i)
i
dz; (3)
ti(^i; ^ i) =
Z qi(^i;^ i)
0
pi(z; ^ i)dz + Li(^ i): (4)
By (4), player i pays the area under her price schedule, up to the quantity she wins, plus
a lump-sum payment that is independent of her report. Given the payment rule and the
reported prole ^, the PPD mechanism assumes that player i has reported truthfully and
then chooses qi to maximize her payo¤, since (3) and (4) imply that
qi(^i; ^ i) 2 argmax
qi
h
vi(qi; ^i)  ti(^i; ^ i)
i
:
Figure 1 illustrates player is part of the outcome (qi; ti) in a PPD mechanism for the case
when Li(^ i) = 0. If we interpret v1i (; i) as the inverse demand curve of player i of type i,
6
and if we interpret pi(; ^ i) as the inverse supply curve player i faces, then the mechanism
chooses the market-clearingquantity. But the payment is that of a buyer who can perfectly
price discriminate, paying the height of the supply curve for each unit she buys.
-
6
Quantity
$
0 qi
v1i (; ^i)
pi(; ^ i)
ti
Figure 1: Player is outcome in a PPD mechanism
3 Revelation Principle
In any PPD mechanism, each player faces a price schedule that is exogenous to her report.
The player cannot change the price that she would pay for any unit. In this situation, the
mechanism determines the quantity for her that maximizes her payo¤, assuming she has told
the truth about her type. The player could do no better if she were allowed to choose for
herself how much quantity to purchase at the exogenous price schedule. In other words, the
mechanism does the optimization for the player. Lying about her type can only cause the
mechanism to mess up the optimization. This gives the player a dominant strategy to report
her type truthfully. We next formalize this intuition with Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Any PPD mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible.
Proof. Consider any  i and any PPD mechanism with price schedules and lump-sum
payments fpi(; ); Li()gi2N . Equation (4) implies that player is report ^i can only a¤ect her
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payment insofar as it a¤ects the quantity player i is awarded. Given  i, note that qi(^i;  i)
may or may not be equal to qi(i;  i) for ^i 6= i. Equations (3) and (4) then imply that
ui(qi(i;  i); ti(i;  i); i) = max
qi
Z qi
0

v1i (z; i)  pi(z;  i)

dz   Li( i)

Z qi(^i; i)
0

v1i (z; i)  pi(z;  i)

dz   Li( i)
= ui(qi(^i;  i); ti(^i;  i); i):
In other words, the PPD mechanism is DSIC.
Of course, the intuition for why a player wants to report her type truthfully is familiar
from the Vickrey auction, but observe that the proof to Proposition 4 in no way depends on
the allocative e¢ ciency of the mechanism. What we show in the next in Proposition is the
more astounding result that any mechanism which induces truthful revelation as a dominant
strategy must be a PPD mechanism.
Proposition 5 [Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategy Implementation] Any
DSIC direct mechanism can be implemented with a PPD mechanism.
Proof. Consider any DSIC direct mechanism (q; t). The idea of our proof is to construct
an individual price schedule pi(; ) and lump-sum payment Li() for each player i 2 N
such that (q; t) can be obtained using equations (3) and (4). Focus on player i. Fix an
arbitrary  i and let qi(i)  qi(i;  i), suppressing the dependence on  i for simplicity,
and similarly throughout this proof. The incentive compatibility and the single-crossing
condition (assumption 2) guarantees that qi(i) is nondecreasing (Theorem 7.2 of Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1991). For all qi 2 [qi(0); qi(1)], dene
i(qi) =

inf fi 2 [0; 1] : qi(i)  qi g for qi  qi(1)
1 otherwise.
Observe that if qi() is strictly increasing then i() is simply the inverse of qi(), or to put it
di¤erently i(qi) is the type of player i who would win qi units in the mechanism. Let player
is price schedule be
pi(qi) = v
1
i (qi; i(qi)): (5)
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Note that neither i(qi) nor pi(qi) depend on player is reported type, although they do
generally depend on  i. Consider
max
qi
Z qi
0

v1i (z; i)  v1i (z; i(z))

dz:
For all z < qi(i), the monotonicity of qi() guarantees that i  i(z). The single-crossing
condition (2) then implies the integrand is nonnegative. Likewise, for all z > qi(i), the
integrand is nonpositive. Therefore,
qi(i) 2 argmax
qi
Z qi
0

v1i (z; i)  v1i (z; i(z))

dz;
thereby establishing (3) for the price schedule in (5).
Now consider the PPD mechanism (q; t) where
ti (^i) =
Z qi(^i)
0
pi(z)dz:
By Proposition 4, (q; t) is a DSIC direct mechanism. Applying the envelope theorem6 to
both (q; t) and (q; t), we have
vi(qi(i); i)  ti(i) = vi(qi(0); 0)  ti(0) +
Z i
0
v2i ((qi(z); z)dz; (6)
vi(qi(i); i)  ti (i) = vi(qi(0); 0)  ti (0) +
Z i
0
v2i ((qi(z); z)dz: (7)
From (6) and (7), we have
ti(i) = t

i (i)  ti (0) + ti(0) =
Z qi(i)
0
pi(z)dz + Li;
where Li   ti (0)+ti(0) does not depend on i. Thus, ti() satises (4) for the price schedule
in (5), so indeed, (q; t) is a PPD mechanism.
This proof makes familiar use of envelope theorem (Milgrom and Segal, 2002 and Milgrom
2004) once we show that the quantity rule we specify in our PPD mechanism is identical
to the quantity rule in the original DSIC mechanism. The PPD mechanism we construct
6We make use of the envelope theorem as given in Theorem 3.1 of Milgrom (2004). See Milgrom and
Segal (2002) for a more general treatment of the envelope theorem.
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in the proof to Proposition 5 shares some features with the mechanism in Ausubel and
Cramton (2004). However, they impose e¢ ciency and then show that their mechanism is
DSIC, whereas we show that all DSIC mechanisms must resemble the Vickrey auction.
4 A Public Good Problem
Consider a simple public good problem between two players of whether to build a public
good or not. We assume this is a pure public good, so that it is not a¤ordable to exclude
anyone from using the public good. For concreteness, we may think of two island residents
who consider having a bridge built. Because the amount of public good needs to be the same
for every player, there are two permissible quantity proles: (q1; q2) 2 Q = f(0; 0); (1; 1)g,
where (0; 0) means the public good will not be built and (1; 1) means that it will. Each player
has linear utility iqi  ti. Player is private value i is continuously distributed on [0; 1] with
distribution function Fi() and positive density fi(). The public good costs c 2 (1; 2) so that
it takes both players to pay for the public good.
A mechanism is budget-balanced if t1+ t2 = c whenever (q1; q2) = (1; 1) and if t1+ t2 = 0
whenever (q1; q2) = (0; 0). A mechanism is feasible if t1 + t2  c whenever (q1; q2) = (1; 1)
and if t1 + t2  0 whenever (q1; q2) = (0; 0). A mechanism is individually rational if each
players utility is nonnegative in the equilibrium for all 1  2 2 [0; 1]2. An allocatively
e¢ cient performance requires that for all 1  2 2 [0; 1]2: (q1; q2) = (1; 1) if and only if
1+ 2  c. It is well known that there is no individually rational mechanism in this setting
that is DSIC, allocatively e¢ cient, and budget-balanced (or even feasible). The mechanism of
Arrow (1979) and dAspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979a, b) forgo DSIC in order to achieve
allocative e¢ ciency and budget-balancedness.7 Alternatively, we forgo allocative e¢ ciency,
and instead search for the DSIC mechanism that maximizes ex ante surplus among all DSIC
mechanisms that are feasible. Appealing to Proposition 5, we may restrict attention to PPD
7See Krishna (2002) or Milgrom (2004) for more on the impossibility results for DSIC mechanisms and
the possibility results for the weaker Bayes-Nash implentation.
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mechanisms. Constructing PPD mechanisms requires constructing the price schedule for
each player. In this public good problem, the small number of permissible quantity proles
and the feasibility constraint helps us pin down the price schedules, as we show next.
Suppose that player 2 reports 2 and player 1 reports ^1, and denote player 1s price
schedule by p1(q1; 2). In any PPD mechanism for this public good problem, the quantity
for player 1 is chosen to solve the following problem:
max
q12f0;1g
Z q1
0
h
^1   p1(z; 2)
i
dz:
Maximization then entails comparing 0 (when q1 = 0) to ^1  
R 1
0
p1(z; 2)dz (when q1 = 1).
Without loss of generality, we may restrict to price schedules that are constants with respect
to quantities by letting:
p1(2) 
Z 1
0
p1(z; 2)dz and p2(1) 
Z 1
0
p2(z; 1)dz:
Thus, in the PPD mechanism q1 = 1 whenever 1 > p1(2) and q1 = 0 whenever 1 < p

1(2),
and similarly for player 2. When 1 = p1(2), the PPD mechanism may specify either q1 = 0
or q1 = 1. Because the only permissible outcomes are (q1; q2) 2 f(0; 0); (1; 1)g, we obtain the
following restrictions for the price schedules:
i > p

i (j)) j  pj(i) for i 6= j and all (i; j) 2 [0; 1]2 (8)
i < p

i (j)) j  pj(i) for i 6= j and all (i; j) 2 [0; 1]2 : (9)
Lemma 6 All price schedules p1(2) and p

2(1) that satisfy restrictions (8) and (9) are
nonincreasing.
Proof. We will show that p1(2) is nonincreasing. To get a contradiction, suppose it is
not. Then for some 2 < 
0
2, we have p

1(2) < p

1(
0
2). Pick any 1 such that p

1(2) < 1 <
p1(
0
2). Restriction (9) requires that 
0
2  p2(1):Thus, 2 < 02  p2(1), which along with
1 > p

1(2) violates restriction (8) for (1; 2).
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We may safely restrict attention to price schedules for i = 1; 2 such that
p1(1) < 1 for i = 1; 2: (10)
Otherwise, because the price schedules are nonincreasing, for almost all realizations of (1; 2)
we would have (q1; q2) = (0; 0) and the public good would not be built. Thus, when (1; 2) =
(1; 1) the project is built, and feasibility requires that:
p1(1) + p

2(1)  c (11)
Consider the especially simple xed-price mechanisms dened below.
Denition 7 A xed-price mechanism is a PPD mechanism such that for some 1 2 [0; 1]
and 2 2 [0; 1] such that 1+ 2 = c, the price schedules are
p^1(2) =

1 for 2 < 2
1 for 2  2 p^2(1) =

1 for 1 < 1
2 for 1  1: (12)
The following proposition shows that we may further restrict attention to xed-price mech-
anisms.
Proposition 8 Consider any feasible PPD mechanism with p1() and p2() satisfying restric-
tions (8)-(11). Then there exists a feasible xed-price mechanism that yields each players at
least as much ex ante expected utility.
Proof. Inequality (11) implies that either p1(1)  c=2 or p2(1)  c=2 or both. Without
loss of generality, suppose that p1(1)  c=2. Now consider the xed-priced mechanism with
the price schedules in (12) using 1 = c p2(1) and 2 = p2(1), and with the same lump-sum
payments as in the original PPD mechanism. It is straightforward to show that i 2 [0; 1)
for i = 1 and 2.
We now show that p^1(2)  p1(2) for all 2 2 [0; 1]. For 2  2 we have
p^1(2) = 1 = c  p2(1)  p1(1)  p1(2);
12
where the rst inequality results from restriction (11) and the second inequality results from
Lemma 6. For 2 < 2 we have p^1(2) = 1: By restriction (9), 2 < 2 = p2(1) implies
that 1  p1(2), so again p^1(2)  p1(2): Similarly, it can be shown that p^2(1)  p2(1)
for all 1 2 [0; 1]. Since the price schedules in this xed-price mechanism never exceed the
price schedules in the original PPD mechanism, the xed-price mechanism yields at least
as much expected utility for each player. The feasibility of the original mechanism and the
construction of the xed-price mechanism guarantees that the xed-price mechanism is also
feasible.
By Proposition 8, we can narrow our search for an optimal DSIC mechanism (maximizing
the playersex ante surplus) by searching within the class of xed-price mechanisms, thus
giving the following proposition.
Proposition 9 Among all feasible DSIC mechanisms, the xed-price mechanism with
(1; 2) 2 argmax
1;2
Z 1
1
Z 1
2
[1 + 2   c] f2(2)f1(1)d2d1 such that 1+2 = c (13)
and no lump sum payments is optimal.
Proof. By Proposition 5, we can search an optimal mechanism within PPD mechanisms,
and by Proposition 8, we can further restrict attention to xed price mechanisms. Note that
(13) maximizes the sum of the playersex ante surpluses over all xed-price mechanisms.
Feasibility requires that the sum of the lump sum payments exceeds zero, and so having
nonzero lump sum payments cannot increase the sum of the player surpluses.
As an example, when each i is uniformly distributed on [0; 1], i.e., f1() = f2() = 1, the
integral in (13) becomes
1
2
(1  2)
 
1  21

+
1
2
(1  1)
 
1  22
  c(1  1)(1  2)
=
1
2
(1  1)(1  2)(2  c) = 2  c
2
(1  1)(1  c+ 1);
which is maximized when 1 = 2 = c=2. This result has a simple interpretation: the public
good is built if and only if each player values the good at least half of its cost, in which
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case, the cost is equally shared. Evaluating (13) at 1 = 2 = c=2 yields ex ante surplus of 
1  1
2
c
3
.
In contrast, the mechanism of dAspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979a, b) and Arrow
(1979) commonly referred to as the expected externality mechanism Bayesian-Nash im-
plements the allocatively e¢ cient outcome, but their mechanism is not DSIC.8 The fully
e¢ cient surplusZ 1
c 1
Z 1
c 1
[1 + 2   c] d2d1 = 4
3

1  1
2
c
3
:
Thus in this example, the optimal DSIC mechanism captures 75% of the total surplus avail-
able. In other words, 25% of the total surplus is the cost of adopting the best DSIC mecha-
nism instead of the best Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism.
5 A Bargaining Problem
Consider Myerson and Satterthwaites (1983) bargaining problem between a buyer (player
1) and a seller (player 2). Each player has linear utility iqi   ti. Each i is continuously
distributed on [0; 1] with distribution function Fi() and positive density function fi(). When
a trade occurs, the buyer obtains the object and the seller forfeits the object. Thus, there are
only two permissible quantity proles: (q1; q2) 2 Q = f(0; 0); (1; 1)g, where (0; 0) means no
trade and (1; 1) means trade.
A mechanism is budget-balanced if t1+t2 = 0 in all outcomes, and feasible if t1+t2  0 for
all outcomes. A mechanism is individually rational if each players utility is nonnegative in
the equilibrium for all 12 2 [0; 1]2. An allocatively e¢ cient performance requires that for
all 12 2 [0; 1]2, (q1; q2) = (1; 1) if and only if 1  2. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)
show that there is no individually rational mechanism in this setting that is DSIC, allocatively
e¢ cient, and budget-balanced. Instead, they nd the surplus-maximizing mechanism among
all budget-balanced mechanisms that can be Bayesian-Nash implemented. Alternatively, we
8See Fudenberg and Tirole (1992), pages 273-275, for details.
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forgo allocative e¢ ciency, and instead search for the DSIC mechanism that maximizes ex ante
surplus among all DSIC mechanisms that are feasible. By Proposition 5, we may restrict
attention to PPD mechanisms. Constructing PPD mechanisms requires constructing the
price schedules for the buyer and the seller. In this bargaining problem, the small number
of permissible quantity proles and the feasibility constraint helps us pin down the price
schedules, as we shown next.
Similar to the public good problem considered in the previous section, we may safely
restrict ourselves to price schedules for the buyer that are constant with respect to quantities
by letting:
p1(2) 
Z 1
0
p1(z; 2)dz:
Now consider the sellers price schedule. Suppose that the buyer reports 1 and the seller
reports ^2, and denote the sellers price schedule by p2(q2; 1). In any PPD mechanism for
this bargaining problem, the quantity for the seller is chosen to solve the following problem:
max
q22f0; 1g
Z q2
0
h
^2   p2(z; 1)
i
dz:
Maximization then entails comparing 0 (when q2 = 0) to
R 0
 1 p2(z; 1)dz  ^2 (when q2 =  1).
Without loss of generality, we may restrict the sellers price schedules to be constant with
respect to quantity by letting:
p2(1) 
Z 0
 1
p2(z; 1)dz
with the interpretation that p2(1) is the payment the seller will receive if there is a trade,
given the buyers reported value of 1. In the PPD mechanism:
q1 =

1 if 1 > p1(2)
0 if 1 < p1(2)
and q2 =
  1 if 2 < p2(1)
0 if 2 > p2(1):
When 1 = p1(2), the PPD mechanism may specify either q1 = 0 or q1 = 1 and when
2 = p

2(1) the PPD mechanism may specify either q2 = 0 or q2 =  1. Because the only
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permissible outcomes here are (q1; q2) 2 f(0; 0); (1; 1)g, the price schedules must satisfy the
following restrictions:
i > p

i (j)) j  pj(i) for i 6= j and all (i; j) 2 [0; 1]2 (14)
i < p

i (j)) j  pj(i) for i 6= j and all (i; j) 2 [0; 1]2 : (15)
Lemma 10 If p1(2) and p

2(1) satisfy restrictions (14) and (15), then p

1(2) and p

2(1)
are nondecreasing.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 6.
We may safely restrict attention to price schedules such that
p1(0) < 1 and p

2(1) > 0: (16)
Otherwise, if either of these conditions did not hold, for almost all realizations of (1; 2) we
would have (q1; q2) = (0; 0) and trade would not occur. Thus, when (1; 2) = (1; 0) trade
occurs, and feasibility requires that:
p1(0)  p2(1) (17)
Consider the PPD mechanism where, whenever trade occurs, the buyer pays a xed-price
and the seller receives a xed-price. Specically, consider the xed-price mechanism dened
below.
Denition 11 A xed-price mechanism is a PPD mechanism such that for some  2 [0; 1] ;
the price schedules are
p^1(2) =

 for 2  
1 for 2 > 
p^2(1) =

0 for 1  
 for 1 > :
(18)
The following proposition shows that we may further restrict attention to xed-price mech-
anisms.
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Proposition 12 Consider any feasible PPD mechanism with p1() and p2() satisfying re-
strictions (14)-(17). There exists a feasible xed-price mechanism that yields the players at
least as much ex ante expected utility.
Proof. Consider the xed-price mechanism with price schedules in (18) using  = p1(0),
and with the same lump-sum payments as in the original PPD mechanism. By (16) and (17)
we have 0 <  < 1.
We now show that p^1(2)  p1(2) for all 2 2 [0; 1]. For 2   we have p^1(2) =
 = p1(0)  p1(2), where the inequality results from Lemma 10. For 2 >  we have
p^1(2) = 1. Using (17), we obtain 2 >  = p1(0)  p2(1). Restriction (14) then implies that
1  p1(2), so again p^1(2)  p1(2). Similarly, it can be shown that p^2(1)  p2(1) for
all 1 2 [0; 1]. Since the buyers price schedule in this xed-price mechanism never exceeds
the price schedule in the original PPD mechanism, and since the sellers price schedule
in this xed-price mechanism always weakly exceeds the price schedule in the original PPD
mechanism, the xed-price mechanism yields at least as much expected utility for the players.
The feasibility of the original mechanism and the construction of the xed-price mechanism
guarantees that the xed-price mechanism is also feasible.
By Proposition 12, we can search for an optimal mechanism (maximizing the players
ex ante surplus) by searching within the class of xed-price mechanisms, thus giving the
following proposition.
Proposition 13 Among all feasible DSIC mechanisms, the xed-price mechanism with
 2 argmax

Z 1

Z 
0
[1   2] f2(2)f1(1)d2d1 (19)
and no lump sum payments is optimal.
Proof. By Proposition 5, we can search for an optimal mechanism within the class of
PPD mechanisms, and by Proposition 12, we can further restrict attention to xed price
mechanisms. Note that (19) maximizes the sum of the playersex ante surpluses over all
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xed-price mechanism. Feasibility requires that the sum of the lump sum payments exceeds
zero, and so having nonzero lump sum payments cannot increase the sum of the player
surpluses.
When i is uniformly distributed on [0; 1], the integral in (19) becomesZ 1

Z 
0
[1   2] d2d1 = 1
2
(1  );
which is maximized when  = 1=2. This result also has a simple interpretation: trade occurs
if and only if the buyers value excesses 1/2 and the sellers value is less than 1/2. Evaluating
(19) at  = 1=2 yields ex ante surplus of 1
8
.
In contrast, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) derive the optimal Bayesian mechanism
and show that trade occurs if and only if 1   2  1=4, thus giving ex ante surplusZ 1
1=4
Z 1  14
0
(1   2) d2d1 = 9
64
:
In this bargaining problem, the optimal DSIC mechanism captures 8/9 of the total surplus.
In other words, about 11% of the total surplus would the cost of adopting any DSIC
mechanism.
Our PPD characterization of DSIC mechanisms complements Hagerty and Rogerson
(1987) who use a completely di¤erent approach to show that xed-price mechanisms are
the only DSIC, budget-balanced, individually rational mechanism for bilateral bargaining.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we characterize all DSIC mechanisms as PPD mechanisms. Many DSIC
mechanisms in the literature can be formulated immediately as PPD mechanisms. For
example, consider various games among players with single-unit demand and linear utility
iqi  ti. The Vickrey (1961) i.e., second price auction is a PPD mechanism where player
is price schedule is
pi(qi;  i) = max
j 6=i
j for 0  qi  1;
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i.e., the highest report of player is opponents. When each distribution Fi() of i is regular,
meaning that the marginal revenueMRi(i) = i [1  Fi(i)] =fi(i) is increasing, Myersons
(1981) optimal auction is implemented by Bulow and Roberts (1989) second marginal
revenueauction, where player is price schedule is
pi(qi;  i) = max
j 6=i

MR 1i (0);MR
 1
i (MRj(j)
	
for 0  qi  1:
Consider McAfees (1992) dominant strategy double auction among m buyers who each
demands one unit and n sellers who each can supply one unit. Each player has linear utility
with type bounded between [0; 1]. Players report their types, the buyersreports are sorted
such that b1  b2      bm, sellersreports are sorted such that s1  s2      sn. To
ensure the mechanism is well dened, McAfee articially appends bm+1 = 0 and sn+1 = 1.
Let k be the the number of e¢ cient trades, i.e., the smallest k such that bk+1 < sk+1. Dene
p = 1
2
(bk+1 + sk+1). If p 2 [sk; bk] then the rst k buyers purchase from the rst k sellers at
price p. Otherwise, the mediator buys a unit from each of the rst k   1 sellers at price sk
and sells a unit to each of the rst the rst k  1 buyers at price bk, pocketing the di¤erence
for herself. McAfee shows that this double auction is a DSIC mechanism.
Alternatively, we can reformulate McAfees auction as a PPD mechanism with the price
schedules determined as follows. Consider any arbitrary buyer and rename her buyer 0. Sort
and rename the other m   1 buyers such that b2  b3      bm. Articially set b1 = 1.
Again, let k be the smallest number such that bk+1 < sk+1 and dene p = 12 (bk+1 + sk+1).
Then buyer 0s price schedule (dened over q0 2 [0; 1]) is
p0(q0;  0) =

bk if p =2 [sk; bk]
p otherwise.
A similar construction provides the sellers price schedule. Our construction is similar to that
in McAfees proof; however, our price schedule makes more explicit that the price schedule
a buyer or seller faces in no way depends on her own report.
In the more general, multiple-unit Vickrey auction (see Vickrey, 1961, pp 66-71) among
players with quasilinear utility functions, to nd the height of buyer is price schedule, one
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needs to nd the aggregate demand of the other buyers and the aggregate supply of the
other sellers built from their reports, and then nd the equilibrium price in the market that
excludes player i. The height of buyer is price schedule at quantity qi is the price at which
a residual supply of qi becomes available. Ausubel (2004) illustrates the price schedule that
a buyer faces in a Vickrey auction, showing a gure remarkably like Figure 1 in this paper.
Likewise, the inverse of the residual demand is the sellers price schedule.
In the third price auction, the highest bidder wins the object and pays the third highest
bid. At rst blush, one might think a third price auction is a PPD mechanism, since a
players own report does not a¤ect the price schedule she faces (the second highest bid of
her opponents). However, the third price auction is not a PPD mechanism since the player
who has the second highest bid receives zero units even though her report exceeds the price
schedule she faces, violating condition (3) in the denition of PPD mechanisms.9
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